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ABSTRACT
The subject “Science and Technology in the First World War” has so far been treated from 
the perspective on inventions and the development of new weapons, and often the focus 
has been on the topic of chemical warfare at the expense of other important dimensions. 
The approach of this Archival Research Guide, by contrast, comes from the social sciences 
and focuses on the establishment of relevant scientific, military and governmental bodies 
and on the personal networks established during the war. By examining these institutions 
and networks country by country, comparisons between them can be drawn, enabling 
further research with regard to the sociology of institutions. By pointing to the connec-
tions and channels of exchange between the nations and institutions under consideration, 
this approach opens up a transnational perspective and supports the paradoxal insight 
that transnational ties can dissolve national obstacles while simultaneously strengthening 
the nation-states themselves. On the individual level, the ARG takes the role of intellec-
tuals into account, for whom scientific objectivity / neutrality and patriotic commitment 
seemed to have been no contradiction. It is remarkable that the First World War led to the 
establishment of several institutions aiming at funding science through the state, most 
notably in the case of France (CNRS), the U.S. (NACA/NASA) and Russia (KEPS).
Note of the Author
The text of this Archival Research Guide follows in each country section a certain struc-
ture: General introduction, a paragraph about the Academy of Sciences of each country, 
and a paragraph for each body / institution including the networks of scientists working 
in these institutions. The records for these bodies can be found in extra notes which have 
been linked to the main text of the Archival Research Guide. The selected institutions 
serve as case studies and as an example of archival and contextual analysis on which the 
CENDARI author has worked on. Since the selection of institutions portrayed is far from 
exhaustive, please feel free to contribute with descriptions of further bodies, boards, com-
mittees and networks of scientists by adding paragraphs to the text of the ARG. The selec-
tion of the case studies follows the following criteria:
• The case studies should describe institutions which connected science, industry, 
the military as well as governmental bodies in belligerent countries during the First 
World War.
• Each body or institution described should be added beginning with a new para-
graph, and the most important persons related to these institutions should be 
named in the text.
• The social background of the individuals within the networks should be noted in 
order to enable subsequent readers to receive an impression about their motives to 
engage in war-related research.
• Special emphasis should be put onto institutions and individuals for whose com-
mitment continuities in the interwar years can be noted, in order to enable trans-
national comparisons and lasting establishment of bodies created during the First 
World War.
The author suggests that the researchers contributing to and adding new case studies fol-
low the recommendations stated above. 
INTRODUCTION
The main outcome of the First World War with respect to Science and Technology was an 
unprecedented rationalization of production resulting from the new involvement of sci-
ence and technology in war. Nevertheless, classical historical research has focused on 
more ‘tangible’ outcomes such as inventions and the development of new technologies, 
like chemical warfare, new weap-
onry, the development of planes, 
tanks and submarines, cameras 
and lenses, or wireless radio trans-
mission; or on the development of a 
political consciousness of scientists 
and the role of science in propagan-
da battles, for example the famous 
1914 manifesto of German scien-
tists “An die Kulturwelt”, signed by 
93 leading intellectuals. But viewed 
against inventions achieved dur-
ing the Second World War like the 
atomic bomb, short-range rock-
ets, and the development of radar 
technology, the First World War did 
not result in comparably singular 
inventions. To fully understand the 
extent of transformations result-
ing from new forms of interdisciplinary collaboration between science, the military and 
industry, and the resulting change in patterns of scientific and technological organization, 
the network of individual scientists, intermediary institutions between science and the 
military and the connective tissues with the industry have to be studied. This can be done 
at best at the level of the belligerent states. Based on these institutions and the networks 
of individuals, the connections and exchanges established between the states can be ex-
plored in order to enable a focus on the transnational dynamic of disseminating scientific 
expertise and assistance and to make comprehensible the shift within the transnational 
scientific network. Thus the emergence of a transnational community and scientific net-
work comes into perspective, a transnational structure which gave shape to the social 
space of international science and to the foundation of new transnational institutions 
after the First World War.
Munitions Production on the Home Front
in Great Britain, 1914-1918
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MAJOR RESEARCH ISSUES
If any of the belligerent nations were to win the war, it would have to master industrial 
mass production and the logistical challenge of supply with materiel and men. It is here, 
at the organizational and production level, where the major impact of science in war can 
be researched. Still, there are no systematic and synthesizing studies on the relation of 
the scientific community and the military. This is the result of nationally oriented research 
traditions, but also of the obvious obstacles to transnational research and the scope of 
the subject. Here subjects of comparison could be: the initial mobilization and industriali-
zation of science before the First World War (especially with respect to investment in dual-
use products); mobilization and discovery of resources; amount of funding by state and 
non-state actors; training of professionals; mono-centric vs. multi-centric industrial bases, 
i.e. national vs. allied endeavours and exchange of knowledge; degrees of system-driven 
innovations indicating the intensity of entanglement between science and industry.
From a general point of view, Germany was seen as the scientifically most advanced coun-
try before the First World War, since it had developed the capacity to industrially organize 
its scientific output, a fact which facilitated the organization of industrial production in 
wartime. The outbreak of the war led to the fragmentation of a shared European intellec-
tual community into separate national entities. While 
German science became isolated – as was the case 
with Russia, where the war broke scientific communi-
cations and contacts with colleagues from belligerent 
nations until the end of the Civil War in 1920 –, the 
allies were able to maintain international scientific 
collaboration, as well as to expand it and to create 
new institutions. This development led to a shift in the 
relative strength within the scientific network, result-
ing in a valorisation of the position of the US, which 
developed into the leading scientific power during 
the First World War, and Germany losing completely 
its primary position in the scientific field. After the 
First World War, priority was placed on the rebuild-
ing of networks of international scientific collabora-
tion, which found its expression in the foundation of institutions like the International 
Research Council and the Union Académique Internationale in 1919, and which followed a 
policy of long-term ostracization of Germany.
In order to comprehend this shift within the scientific community and to characterize the 
development of the network between science, the military and the industry as well as its 
transnational dimension, biographical sources of the persons involved as well as the docu-
mentation on the intermediary institutions between science and military during and after 
the war have to be studied. While the networks of individual scientists can be researched 
through the letters, diaries and memoirs provided by them, the records of the institutions 
founded during and after the war provide information on the development of the scientif-
ic-military-industrial complex. Tools like Named Entity Recognition and the visualization of 
most common persons provided in CENDARIs Note Taking Environment assist researchers 
in grasping the developments and adjustments within the networks. In this way, the new 
levels of cooperation between scientists and engineers, industrialists and military lead-
ers can be put into perspective. Special attention should be paid to the scientific liaison 
between the belligerent nations, individual persons not only providing for connections 
during wartime, but also for the establishment of scientific collaboration after the war, 
especially in its most important institutions, the International Union of Academies and the 
International Research Council.
Germany
Before the First World War, the German Empire had already been the leading scientific 
country in the world. Close connections between academic science, industry and the 
government had already been established with the founding of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Ge-
sellschaft in 1911 with its president, the theologian Adolf von Harnack, the recipient of 
the Nobel Price in chemistry Emil Fischer, who served as chairman of the administrative 
board, and members like physician and chemist Walther Nernst, industrialist and chemist 
Franz Oppenheim, and the politician and collaborator of the Reichsjustizamt Ernst Tren-
delenburg, who served as secretary general of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft between 
1912 and 1918. Several senators of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft belonged to the gov-
ernment of the German Empire. The institutes founded by the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft 
were financed by the upper classes and Jewish bankers; industrialists like Alfred Krupp 
and financier Leopold Koppel can serve as examples here.
Koppel financed the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for Physical Chemistry und Elektrochemistry, 
inaugurated in 1912, for which chemist Fritz Haber served 
as the first director. German scientists had thus already 
established contacts and cooperation with industry, and 
the outbreak of war brought forward a dense entanglement 
between scientists, industrialists and military leaders. The 
famous manifesto “An die Kulturwelt”, which was signed in 
October 1914 by 93 leading German intellectuals, illustrates 
a hitherto unknown willingness of scientists and engineers to 
serve the German cause and to commit themselves to their 
nation. In comparison with other countries, this degree of 
self-mobilization was unprecedented. Researching the net-
works of these individuals and organisations on a broad basis 
would therefore answer the question of what motivated a 
whole social group like the mostly bourgeois, often Jewish 
scientists leave behind their international scientific networks 
and seek recognition by the military – a preserve of noble 
privilege – and to set aside all moral and ethical qualms.
There is already a considerable research literature on hand for prominent examples, such 
as: Fritz Haber, the so-called “father of chemical warfare”, who was born into a Jewish 
family and promoted to the rank of a captain, worked in the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for 
Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry and in Walther Rathenau’s Raw Materials Depart-
Fritz Haber
Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-S13651, via 
Wikimedia Commons [CC-BY-SA 
3.0]
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ment, and who was made head of the Chemistry Section in the Ministry of War. Scholar-
ship has also addressed Emil Fischer, who was working with industrialist Carl Duisberg 
and Walther Nernst in the War Ministry, in the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Stiftung für kriegstechnis-
che Wissenschaft (Kaiser Wilhelm Foundation for the Science of War Technology), and in 
close cooperation with companies like Bayer, BASF and Hoechst. But there are several 
other institutions and individuals, who have not yet or only marginally been in the focus 
of research. The best entry point for research on this subject remains the Kaiser-Wilhelm-
Gesellschaft with its several institutes; the records of the KWG as well as the legacy of 
several scientists can be found in the archives of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förder-
ung der Wissenschaften, in the archives of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences 
and the Secret State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation. Particularly commit-
ted to research was the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochem-
istry, financed by the Koppel-Foundation, where only one year after the outbreak of the 
war more than 1.500 members of staff worked. The Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt in 
Göttingen had been founded in 1907 under the name “Modellversuchsanstalt für Aerody-
namik der Motorluftschiff-Studiengesellschaft” with Ludwig Prandtl as its head; in 1915 
the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft became engaged in this society, and it was formally incor-
porated into the KWG at the end of the war under the name “Aerodynamische Versuch-
sanstalt der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft” (AVA). The Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for Chem-
istry became involved in war-related research under its director Ernst Beckmann during 
the second and third year of war. One of its departments was headed by Otto Hahn. In 
1916 the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Stiftung für kriegstechnische Wissenschaft was founded and 
also financed by Leopold Koppel via his Koppel-Foundation. To prepare the foundation of 
the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Stiftung für kriegstechnische Wissenschaft, Fritz Haber and Friedrich 
Schmidt-Ott, an assistant secretary of state in the Kultusministerium and later Prussian 
Minister of Culture, had led decisive conversations and drafted the charter. After the war 
this foundation was separated from the war ministry and attached to the Reichsministe-
rium des Inneren, and it was renamed the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Stiftung für technische Wissen-
schaft. Though much of this foundation’s records have not survived, it is a good example 
of the preparedness of the military to finance research related to military-technological 
questions without being directly influenced by the military. Generally, the Kaiser-Wilhelm-
Gesellschaft and its institutes provide for the most interesting examples of the entangle-
ment between science, industry and the military, since its administrative department was 
enlarged during the war by the entrepreneur Friedrich Springorum, the Jewish Banker 
Arthur Salomonsohn, the Silesian entrepreneur and researcher Paul Schottländer, and the 
chemist and industrialist Carl Duisberg. The relation of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft 
vis-à-vis the state changed massively during the war due to the financial commitment of 
the administration of the army and the navy. Even though this influence reduced after the 
war, the KWG explained its orientation towards applied science only ex post.
Beyond the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, several other institutions are relevant here, es-
pecially the ones at Göttingen, where close connections between science and the military 
were established and whose roles within the ‘Göttingen system’ have not yet been fully 
explored. Amongst them are the Institut für angewandte Elektrizität (Institute for applied 
electricity), which had been founded in 1905 by the physicist Hermann Theodor Simon, 
and where the army and the navy in collaboration with the mathematician and politi-
cian Felix Klein established a station to experiment with wireless telegraphy. In 1912, the 
Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft für Luftfahrt (Scientific Society for Aviation) was founded 
in Göttingen, where Ludwig Prandtl was involved and whose board incorporated repre-
sentatives from science, industry, state and the military (for a visualisation of the relations 
between Ludwig Prandtl and Felix Klein follow this link). Finally, also in 1912 the Deutsche 
Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt was founded in Berlin-Adlershof; it had colonel Hugo Schmie-
decke and colonel Hermann Rieß von Scheurnschloß as its first presidents and established 
a body of civilian scientists and engineers to research on aviation.
It is remarkable that after the war and the ostracization of German science in the interna-
tional scientific community, a lot of aforementioned scientists, notably Fritz Haber, Frie-
drich Schmidt-Ott, Adolf von Harnack, Max Planck and Hermann Diels founded in 1920 the 
Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Association of German Science), 
whose first president was Friedrich Schmidt-Ott. This Emergency Association was renamed 
in 1929 as the Deutsche Gemeinschaft zur Erhaltung und Förderung der Forschung, or, 
in an abbreviated and nowadays more common form, the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft (DFG; German Research Foundation)
France
In France important scientific research and teaching structures existed long before the 
First World War, but basic research was not funded by the state and linkages between sci-
entific research and industry were weak. The most obvious example for this can be seen 
in the realm of chemistry, where connections between science and industry were weak 
and products had to be imported from Germany, where such linkages were the strongest 
in Europe. Only in aviation there existed a vital collaboration between science, technology, 
and industry, thanks to such figures like the constructing engineer Louis Blériot. Another 
exception is to be found in the field of research on explosives, since there had been estab-
lished a Commission des substances explosives with chem-
ist and biologist Marcellin Berthelot as its president; 
this commission had been founded during the Franco-
German War of 1870. In 1887 a Commission d’examen des 
inventions intéressant les armées de terre et de mer had 
been founded which included Marcellin Berthelot and 
several other members of the French Academy of Sci-
ences. The First World War provided a strong stimulus 
to establish relations between science, technology and 
industry, and since there was a consensus between sci-
entists and politicians that these relations should be es-
tablished on a broad basis and that existing institutions 
and structures should be reformed in order to achieve 
a new place for science in society, institutionalization 
was the consequence. Finally, the social background of 
the persons involved should be examined; though some 
of the scientists and industrialists involved came from 
the French nobility - especially the ones committed to 
aviation -, most of the scientists came from the haute bourgeoisie. Their commitment to 
the war effort has to be judged within the broader development in the relations between 
Jules-Louis Breton
Library of Congress digital ID ggbain.30110
[No known restrictions on publication]
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science, society and the state, i.e. a history of the intellectuals, since only 16 years had 
passed between the famous “J’accuse”-manifesto launched by Émile Zola (which heated up 
the Dreyfus Affair) and the beginning of the First World War.
The best example for this and its focus on inventions can be seen in the instalment of a 
Commission supérieure des Inventions, which was put in place in the first days of war 
and led by the mathematician Paul Appell. Though the establishment of this commission 
encouraged a general mobilization of scientists, it was only in November 1915 that a Di-
rection des Inventions intéressant la défense nationale was set up by the mathematician 
Paul Painlevé, who had become the minister of education in October of that year. The 
retarded creation of the Direction des Inventions can be explained by the belief of many 
politicians and the military in a short war. The purpose of the Direction des Inventions was 
to evaluate incoming proposals by inventors on the basis of their potential contribution to 
industry, economy and defense, to enhance interactions between science and the indus-
try and to back up scientific mobilization. The Commission supérieure des Inventions was 
attached to the Direction des Inventions, and the latter underwent several transformations 
in the following years.
In December 1916 it was transferred to the Ministère de l’armement et des fabrications de 
guerre and elevated to a Sous-secrétariat d’état headed by Jules-Louis Breton, an inventor 
and socialist politician. In April 1917 it was renamed to Sous-secrétariat d’état des inven-
tions, des études et des expériences techniques and in September 1917 it was transferred 
to the Ministry of War. The fact that the Direction des Inventions did not cease with the 
end of the war shows that it and especially Jules-Louis Breton had proven that they were 
capable of supporting the inventors for the benefit of the whole country. After the war, 
Breton was elected a member of the Academy of Sciences. Under his influence, the Direc-
tion des Inventions was again attached to the Ministry of Public Instruction and in 1922 
transformed and renamed the Office National des recherches scientifiques, industrielles et 
des inventions (ONRSII). The strong tendency in France to institutionalize and to maintain 
these institutions can be read from the further development of the Office National: Up to 
1938 it existed with Breton as its director, and was then reorganized into the Centre na-
tional de la recherche scientifique appliquée, which was fused in 1939 with the Caisse nation-
ale de la recherche scientifique to form the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) 
– nowadays the largest governmental research organization in France. Obviously Breton 
had made good use of his connections established during the war, and the Office national 
shifted its focus from evaluating inventions towards scientific discovery, the interaction of 
science and technology, funding by the state and fostering close connections with govern-
mental departments, industry and the military.
A comparable tendency to keep institutions after they had been founded can be observed 
in the realm of chemistry. At the beginning of the war, the number of French academic 
chemists was one-tenth of Germany’s. In September 1914, the Office national des produits 
chimiques et pharmaceutiques was founded, with the chemists Auguste Béhal as head 
and Amand Valeur as its secretary general, and within which renowned scientists like 
Octave Boudouard, member of the Collège de France, were engaged. The Office des produits 
chimiques supported the French industry to overcome its dependence on German enter-
prises and technical equipment. Furthermore, the Office des produits chimiques rendered 
assistance to the foundation of production sites, since the war had disrupted the trade 
of chemical and pharmaceutical products. The quick upsurge of the French industry can 
be read from the reaction after the famous 22 April 1915 attack by the Germans. Neither 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch nor any of the scientists involved hesitated to develop com-
parable weapons. A committee on chemical warfare research was quickly set up which 
consisted of General Perret, Charles Moureu of the Collège de France, the physicist and 
chemist André Kling, the chemists Paul Lebeau and Victor Grignard (Nobel Prize winner for 
chemistry in 1912), and several other professors in French schools and faculties. Only two 
years later the French were able to reply in kind to the Germans, and the concentration 
of French chemical factories located along the Western front remains to this day. In terms 
of efficiency, the increase of production and the resourcefulness of the French scientific 
community and allied industry was enourmous in the case of gas warfare, even though 
the moral implications never seem to have been debated. Because of industrialized chemi-
cal production’ dual use, covering civilian and military needs, and because the cooperation 
between the French government, science, and industrial chemistry was estimated to be 
functioning well, a Commission des études et experiences chimiques was established in the 
1920s in the Ministry of War, with Charles Moureu and several people remaining in similar 
functions to regulate the import of chemical, pharmaceutical and dyes products. Though 
the Office des produits chimiques ceased to exist as an organization, it was founded again 
as the Direction des industries chimiques within the Ministry of Industry in September 1940.
Another field in which the quick upsurge of French industries and their close collabora-
tion with scientists became visible was aviation. Before the war, there existed an Institute 
Aérotechnique at the University of Paris, whose laboratory was installed at the military 
school of Saint-Cyr. During the First 
World War it was put at the disposal of 
the army and became the headquar-
ters of the newly created Section Tech-
nique de l’Aéronautique Militaire, with 
captain Emile Dorand at its head. Here, 
distinguished persons such as the aris-
tocrat, industrialist and scientist Ar-
mand de Gramont (the duc de Guiche), 
engineer and inventor Henri Chrétien, 
the industrialist Émile-Louis Letord, 
and the engineer Albert Étévé were 
visible. A wind tunnel was constructed 
during the war, and the military creat-
ed a station for testing and comparing 
the performance of different motors 
in a cold atmosphere. Until the end of 
the war, this institution grew in one of the best-equipped aeronautics laboratories in the 
world. The research section of the Institute Aérotechnique continued to exist until 1933, 
when it was dissolved by Paul Painlevé, who had by this time become minister of air. The 
Section Technique de l’Aéronautique was reorganized in 1919 and renamed into Service Tech-
nique de l’Aéronautique (STAé) and continued to exist up to 1980.
Dorand AR 1 (French Airplane)
Image by Air Service, United States Army [Public domain, Permis-
sion USGOV-PD], via Wikimedia Commons
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Great Britain
The British had already in 1909 formed an Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, which set 
the precedent for the organization of inventions research in Britain. Its members included 
Dr. Richard Glazebrook, then director of the National Physical Laboratory, who served 
as chairman, Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles Hadden, Capt. R.H.S. Bacon, Sir G. Greenhill, Dr. W.N. 
Shaw, Horace Darwin, H.R.A. Mallock, Prof. J.E. Petavel, and F.W. Lanchester. During the 
war, the Royal Society set up a War Committee at Burlington House including William 
Ramsay, Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir Alfred Ewing, R.J. Strutt (later Lord Rayleigh), Arthur Schus-
ter, and Richard Glazebrook, and others. It aimed at providing assistance to the govern-
ment on scientific investigations related to the war. Several fellows of the Royal Society 
also took part in a whole range of committees and boards attached to ministries like the 
War Office, the Ministry of Munitions and the Admiralty. Amongst these committees and 
boards, the most notable ones were the Board of Invention and Research (BIR), which 
was installed with the Admiralty, and the Munitions Inventions Department (MID) at the 
Ministry of Munitions. Most of these committees and boards did not outlive the First 
World War, with the remarkable exception of the Committee for Scientific and Industrial 
Research, which became in 1916 the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
(DSIR) and which was maintained until 1965. The task of these committees and boards 
was usually to check incoming proposals by British inventors for applicability, but also to 
initiate and encourage scientific research. International scientific cooperation after the 
First World War was pursued by the Royal Society and its secretary, Franz Arthur Friedrich 
Schuster. Even though (or because) most of the institutions under consideration here 
were dissolved at the end of the war, the dense networks of scientists, the duplication of 
their functions and their collaboration with the military as well as the precedent they set 
in involving civilian scientists in the organization and administration of science have not 
yet been intensely studied.
On 12th November 1914, the Council of the Royal Society decided to offer its services to 
aid Government work. 250 years after its foundation, the Royal Society thus gave up its 
political neutrality, which had been seen to be founded in scientific objectivity. Though it 
cannot be expected that this reappraisal of the role of the scientist in society is reflected 
in the personal papers of Fellows of the Royal Society (FRS), this process has to be seen in 
the larger context of the intellectual vis-à-vis the state, and it is proof of the fact that na-
tionalism had reached its unquestioned height with the beginning of the First World War. 
The Council of the Royal Society appointed a War Committee, which informed the Admi-
ralty, the War Office, and the Board of Trade of their collaborations, and Government bod-
ies returned lists with research questions and tasks. They then set up several Government 
committees like the BIR and the DSIR, populated partly with Fellows of the Royal Society. 
Within the Royal Society, several Sub-Committees were formed, concerned with chem-
istry, engineering, physics, food, grain pests, natural products, and physiology. The Sub-
Committees not only consisted of Fellows of the Royal Society, but also included at times 
military men, like Colonel Sir Frederic Nathan, who was member of the Natural Products 
Committee, and Captain A.E. Boycott, who participated in the Sectional Committee on 
Physiology. In this way the Royal Society responded to the technical challenges of the First 
World War and to the lack of supplies from German factories, especially regarding phar-
maceutical drugs and photographic components. Fundamental research was undertaken 
for example in the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) with Sir Richard Glazebrook as its 
Director between 1899 and 1919, and the costs were shared between the Royal Society 
and the Treasury; during 1918 the NPL was transferred to the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research. Like in the other belligerent nations, the overlap between the Royal 
Society and the Government was manifold: Several Fellows were prominent Members of 
Parliament (like Arthur James Balfour and Winston Churchill) and/or members of Govern-
ment, or they worked in government-sponsored occupations at home and abroad, like Sir 
Basil Mott, an engineer who worked in France on defense schemes and on various Gov-
ernment Committees, or Sir Alexander Fleming, Captain in the Royal Army Medical Corps, 
who worked at the wartime laboratory for medical research at the casino in Boulogne. 
Interestingly enough, the British case also provides an example of failure in the collabora-
tion between scientists and the military. The Board of Invention and Research (BIR) ex-
isted between July 1915 and September 1917. It was created on the initiative of A.J. Balfour 
as the First Lord of the Admiralty and resulted from the need for the provision or inven-
tion of new weapons and the munitions shortages faced by the Royal Navy. The task of the 
BIR was to sort out propositions by inventors and to sponsor scientific research of value to 
naval warfare and was designed as a body of scientists preoccupied with basic research. 
Admiral John “Jackie” Fisher, the former First Sea Lord, became the first chairman of the 
BIR, and it had a central committee consisting of three eminent scientist (J.J. Thomson, 
Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics at Cambridge and discoverer of the electron, 
Sir Charles Parsons, inventor of the steam turbine, and Dr. (later Sir) George Beilby, chair-
man of the Royal Technical College, Glasgow. The consulting panel consisted of twelve 
scientific experts with four chemists, four physicists (amongst them Sir Ernest Rutherford, 
Prof. W.H. Bragg, and R.J. Strutt, later Lord 
Rayleigh), three engineers (Mr. William 
Duddell, Mr. Gerald Stoney, and Professor 
Bertram Hopkinson, Professor of Mechan-
ics at Cambridge), and one metallurgist. 
Only three military officers were present 
in its sub-committees. The activities of the 
BIR were targeted in such diverse areas as 
the use of helium instead of hydrogen in 
airships, the lighting of aerodrome run-
ways, the research on metal erosion and 
corrosion, and on anti-submarine devices. 
Furthermore, the BIR cooperated with 
the French Ministry of Inventions, even if 
the most liaisons between British and foreign governmental institutions were established 
by military officers. Although the BIR acquired a reputation particularly through its anti-
submarine research, it was ineffective in facilitating cooperation between the BIR and 
the Navy, and its approach to basic and fundamental research was in contrast with the 
Navy’s focus on pragmatic, trial-and-error approach to research and development. These 
constraints led to the dissolution of the BIR in September 1917, and it was reduced to the 
central committee in December 1917, while research work was transferred to a new de-
partment of the Director of Experiments and Research (DER) under Charles Merz.
British Tank
Image by Europeana 1914-1918, [Public domain]
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Much like the BIR, the Munitions Inventions Department (MID) of the Ministry of Muni-
tions was established in August 1915, when the government faced shortages of essential 
supplies, and it aimed equally at sifting through inventions proposals. Lloyd George, the 
First Minister of Munitions, chose engineer Mr. E.W. (later Sir) Ernest Moir as a chairman, 
who set up the MIDs Advisory Panel consisting of Sir J.J. Thomson, FRS, Professor Richard 
Glazebrook, FRS, Mr. (later Sir) Horace Darwin, FRS, civil engineer and founder of the Cam-
bridge Scientific Instruments Company, Sir Robert Hadfield, FRS, metallurgist and manag-
ing director of Hadfields Ltd, steel manufacturers, Professor J.S. Haldane, FRS, Reader in 
Physiology at the New College in Oxford, S.Z. de Ferranti, founder of Ferranti Ltd, electrical 
engineers, F.W. Lanchester, consultant aeronautical and motor engineer, and three mili-
tary officers from the War Office.
The Advisory Panel grew to forty-eight 
members in 1918, seventeen of whom 
were Fellows of the Royal Society (FRS), 
and with notable duplications and over-
laps with other bodies like the BIR, the 
DSIR, and the Air Inventions Committee. 
The MID incorporated university and in-
dustrial laboratories, private workshops, 
and government agencies such as the 
National Physical Laboratory. The em-
phasis of the department’s work shifted 
during the war from evaluating inven-
tions to initiating research programmes. 
The MID facilitated the development of a 
machine-gun belt, a gyroscope, a number 
of gunsights and signalling instruments, 
a prototype tank, and the Stokes mortar 
invented by Mr. F.W. (later Sir) Wilfred Stokes. Remarkable is also the Anti-Aircraft Experi-
mental Section (AAES) of the MID, which was founded to provide a comprehensive train-
ing scheme for anti-aircraft gunners developed by physiologist Archibald Vivian Hill, who 
was to become one of the most prominent figures in military scientific research during 
the inter-war years, besides Henry Tizard and H.E. Wimperis. The MID was dissolved on 1 
July 1919, and none of the scientists partaking in the Advisory Panel continued in military 
service. As with most bodies created during the First World War in Great Britain, the sig-
nificance of the MID lies not with the inventions and development of weapons produced, 
but with the experience gained in establishing connections between scientists and the 
government.
The institution that was set up from the beginning for the longer term was the Depart-
ment of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). Its predecessor, the Advisory Council, 
was conceived within the Board of Education in July 1915. Already in autumn 1914, a 
scheme had been drafted by Christopher (later Viscount) Addison and Frank (later Sir 
Frank) Heath and related to Sir Joseph Pease, President of the Board of Education. After 
the Cabinet reshuffle of May 1915, Sir Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge prepared this scheme 
and presented it as a White Paper in July 1915, which already underlined that the new Ad-
visory Council would not be confined to be a wartime phenomenon. Sir William Symington 
McCormick was to become the first chairman of the Advisory Council, and it also included 
three industrial chemists (Sir George Beilby, Raphael Meldola, head of Finsbury Technical 
College, and Sir Richard Threlfall, consulting engineer and manufacturing chemist), two 
engineers (William Duddell and Bertram Hopkinson, who were at the same time mem-
bers of the BIR) and two physicists (R.J. Strutt, later Lord Rayleigh and J.A. (later Sir John) 
McLennan, Professor of Physics at Toronto, who was currently working on antisubmarine 
measures). The task of the Advisory Council was to initiate and fund specific research, to 
support work in special scientific and technical institutions, and to direct research in tech-
nology and the physical sciences in Britain. In November 1916, the Advisory Council was 
confirmed as the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research (DISR), a name which 
eventually changed to Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). Other than 
f.ex. the KEPS Commission in Russia (see below), it did not encourage scientific education 
funded by the state and linked with pure and applied research; teaching still remained 
separated from research, and research separated from industry. In this respect, the DSIR 
missed the chance to establish closer links between science and industry. 
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USA
The U.S. developed into a major, if not the leading scientific power during the First World 
War. This hypothesis is substantiated by the fact that the U.S. started already in 1915 with 
the institutionalization of several bodies where research, the military and the industry 
closely collaborated – even though the official declaration of war against Germany was 
to be effected only on 6 April 1917. It is therefore crucial to see that the pressure to take 
decisions towards the founding of several institutions sprang from the economy, since 
several countries like Great Britain, France and Russia had placed orders for weapons, mu-
nitions, raw materials and industrial products in the U.S. The common interest between 
industry, the military, the state and science led in the U.S. to the most obvious develop-
ment of a scientific-military-industrial complex. The United States started very early to 
share scientific information with their allies, and the First World War can be seen as the 
beginning of the intense relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain in terms of se-
curity and defence science. As early as March 1915, the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA) was founded as a U.S. federal agency, which was to become NASA in 
1958. In July 1915, a Naval Consulting Board was established on the proposition of the in-
ventor and industrialist Thomas Edison, and he was also the one to bring forward the idea 
in May 1915 to create a Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), for which the Congress allocated 
in 1917 significant funds. From the side of the state, a Council for National Defense was 
created in 1916 with the task of advising decision-makers in the government, to coordi-
nate military and civilian departments of state in munitions and other fields, and to place 
industrial goods and services during the war. From the side of science, the National Acad-
emy of Sciences (NAS) created in September 1916 the National Research Council (NRC); 
from the beginning of 1917 it was to become under the name Department of Science and 
Research part of the Council for National Defense. The National Research Council founded 
in December 1917 a Research Information Committee (RIC, which was later renamed into 
Research Information Service RIS). Finally the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) came into 
being first as a Gas Service Section in 1917, the CWS was formally established in June 1918; 
only in 1946 it was renamed the Chemical Corps.
It is not easy to discern the networks and close collaborations established during the First 
World War between science, the military and the industry. At the same time it is remark-
able that the transnational scientific liaisons during and after the war are especially 
well visible from the example of the U.S., and several central individuals in the networks 
should be highlighted. To begin with science, the astronomer George Ellery Hale had since 
1903 been the foreign secretary of the United States National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
and played a key role in supporting the government in using science for military ends. He 
had been delegated to the International Association of Academies in 1907, and he mobi-
lized physicist Robert A. Millikan from the University of Chicago and Arthur A. Noyes from 
MIT to support the foundation of the National Research Council (NRC), whose first meet-
ing took place in September 1916; Hale became the first chairman of the NRC and Mil-
likan the vice-chairman. Hale and pathologist William Welch were accredited by the State 
Department for the first official scientific mission to Britain and France in 1916. In early 
1917, the NRC took up contacts with the scientific academies and London, Paris, St. Peters-
burg and Rome, and the French and British governments sent delegations to the United 
States. From France came physicists Charles Fabry and Henri Abraham, industrialist and 
scientist Armand de Gramont, chemist Victor Grignard, and the wireless expert Lieutenant 
Paternot. The British sent physicist Sir Ernest Rutherford and Commander Cyprian Bridge. 
The Italian physicist Giorgio Abetti was to join the mission, sent by the Italian Inventions 
Board; he later became military attaché in Washington. In June 1917 a conference was 
organized by the NRC which provided for scientific exchange on a high level; the physi-
cists Henry Andrew Bumstead, Nobel Prize winner Albert A. Michelson, John Zeleny and 
Ernest Fox Nichols of Yale took part. The National Research Council was also responsible 
for establishing the Research Information Committee (RIC) in December 1917, whose task 
was to provide the linkages with the offices of Military and Naval Intelligence and to coor-
dinate their international scientific activities. Its first chairman became Samuel W. Strat-
ton, director of the National Bureau of Standards and later president of the MIT. Science 
attachés were appointed in January 1918 and sent to Europe: engineer William Frederick 
Durand (who had formerly been working with the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics) was sent to Paris together with his deputy Karl T. Compton, Henry A. Bumstead to 
London, engineer Samuel L.G. Knox to Rome. The offices in London, Paris and Rome sent 
reports on a weekly basis, and the RIC was to receive, index and distribute these records 
to the American military agencies. Especially Bumstead was able to create a large network 
around himself. In July 1918 it was renamed the “Research Information Service” (RIS) after 
a direct liaison between the RIC and the Information Section and Ordnance Department 
had been established. George Ellery Hale, who planned for the time after the war early 
onwards, proposed to have an Inter-Allied Research Council, and during three meetings in 
October (London) and November (Paris) 1918 and July (Brussels) 1919, a new body named 
International Research Council (IRC) was created. The executive committee included Hale, 
Picard, Schuster, G. Lecointe from the Académie Royale in Belgium and the Italian physi-
cist Vito Volterra. The IRC provided the basis for future scientific collaboration and shifted 
the emphasis from German to English language usage – German and Austrian scientists 
were excluded. The RIS itself continued to exist up to the Second World War, where Du-
rand’s former deputy, Karl Compton worked for the National Research Defense Commit-
tee and the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). To sum it up, the RIC/
RIS established a considerable network of personal contacts and provided a model in 
scientific exchange diplomacy. Systematic cooperation and effective coordination of the 
scientific exchange between the allies and an extensive network of personal contacts has 
been its major achievement.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S. lagged behind European aviation capabili-
ties. The beginning of the First World War in Europe provided for a strong stimulus to 
promote aviation for the benefit of both military and civilian (i.e. commercial) aircraft. 
Since it was unusual to receive government funding for scientific or engineering research 
in the period before the Second World War, it is not astonishing that the initiative to found 
a body promoting aeronautical science came from civil society and not from the side of 
the government. It was already in 1914 when the paleontologist Charles D. Walcott, then 
secretary of the Smithsonian institution, organized a conference in Washington D.C. to 
enhance aeronautical research and to restore preeminence to American aviation, and 
quite clearly the war served as a catalyst for the installation of an American agency. Al-
ready on 3rd March 1915 the National Advisory Council for Aeronautics was founded as an 
independent government agency. On that day both chambers of the Congress approved of 
the Naval Appropriation Bill to which the enacting legislation for the NACA was attached 
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as a rider. The model agency for the NACA was the British Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics, which had been founded in 1909. The American legislation gave an annual budget 
of $5,000 to the NACA for the first five years. The limited funding underlined its advisory 
function, and study and research was done by a government agency or university labora-
tory. The Committee consisted of 12 members coming from the government, the military 
and from civil society: Two each from the Army and Navy, one representative from the 
National Bureau of Standards, the U.S. Weather Bureau, and the Smithsonian Institution. 
Finally, five additional at-large members were selected because of their expertise in aero-
nautical science; they had to come from academia and research institutions, but not from 
the aircraft industry. During the First World War the NACA established the Langley Memo-
rial Aeronautical Laboratory in Hampton, Virginia. It was named after Samuel Pierpont 
Langley, Walcott’s predecessor as a Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and a former 
military airfield was rebuilt into this research station; the laboratory was inaugurated only 
in 1920. It was also only after the war that George W. Lewis became the Committee’s first 
Director of Aeronautical Research in 1923, in which position he remained until 1947. Per-
sonal continuities up to the Second World War can also be noted for the NACA: John F. Vic-
tory became the first salaried employee for the NACA in 1915, its secretary in 1921, and its 
executive secretary in 1948. Jerome C. Hunsaker had already been member of the NACA 
from 1922-23, and from 1941-1956 he chaired the Main Committee. He remained a mem-
ber of the NACA until it was transformed into NASA in 1958, at which time he retired. 
The quick progress the U.S. made in the field of science of technology during the First 
World War can be seen in chemical warfare, for which the U.S. army was not prepared. It 
was only in April 1917, when George Arthur Burrell began to create a research network of 
universities, chemical industry representatives, and private institutions, and got chemist 
Warren K. Lewis of MIT and physiologist Yandell Henderson of Yale as well as private com-
panies like Dow Chemical, General Electric and the B.F. Goodrich Company involved. Gov-
ernmental chemical production was established in Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland, and 
later on war chemicals were produced there. The 
major American invention was Lewisite, a war gas 
that fortunately was never employed in the First 
World War. Under the command of Major General 
William L. Sibert the Chemical Warfare Service 
(CWS) was established in June 1918, which also 
incorporated the 1st Gas Regiment deployed to 
France. Chemicals found on the battlefield were in-
vestigated in a laboratory driven by the American 
Expeditionary Forces (AEF). In the field, gas attacks 
were performed with Livens projectors, stoke mor-
tars and artillery. By the end of the war, American 
chemical production was four times as high as the 
amount of chemicals fabricated by Germany. 
Russia
Looking at developments in Russian science and technology, three dimensions of this 
underresearched topic have to be taken into regard: The advancements of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, who took the initiative in the foundation of the Commission for the 
Study of Scientific-Productive Forces (KEPS) as well as the institutions founded during the 
war, especially the War-Industries Committees and the Joint Committee of the Union of 
Zemstvos and of Towns for the Supply of Military Equipment and Munitions. Furthermore, 
particular institutions like the War Chemical Committee should be studied, since it later 
became the Institute of Applied Chemistry. Generally, the First World War led to a con-
siderable transformation of the relations between Russian science and industry. The war 
pushed forward a move from theoretical, “pure” science to applied sciences, a consider-
able growth in the numbers of trained specialists and applied research, and the establish-
ment of institutional foundations which survived the war and coordinated the activities of 
military, state, and civilian actors. While it has to be noted that the war had a lasting and 
transformative effect on Russian science and technology, the social aspects of these de-
velopments are particularly interesting, since the bourgeois scientists and engineers man-
aged to establish themselves as an influential group in respect to the Tsarist regime and 
the Bolshevik government respectively. Although the First World War and the Russian Civil 
War broke scientific communications and contacts between Russian scientists and their 
colleagues from enemy states, the foundations of a new Soviet scientific and technological 
culture were laid in this time.
The Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences was in 1899 a founding member of the Inter-
national Association of Academies (IAA) and stayed in close contact with its partners in 
Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, Göttingen, Washington, Vienna, and elsewhere. In 1913, the 
last general assembly was held in Saint Petersburg; the IAA did de facto not exist anymore 
during the war, but it can be seen as a predecessor of the International Research Council 
IRC, which was founded in 1918. Several members of the Russian Academy like the orien-
talist Sergey Fedorovich Oldenburg and the mineralogist and geochemist Vladimir Verna-
dsky stayed in close contact with their colleagues from the German academies like Her-
mann Diels and Wilhelm von Waldeyer-Hartz, and they were to become influential figures 
in the Soviet era. On 21 January 1915 the Academy came forward with the proposition to 
found a Commission for the Study of Scientific-Productive Forces (KEPS), whose task was 
to produce overviews on Russian natural resources and to direct scientific and technologi-
cal assistance for a more effective engagement in the war effort. The Commission was 
led by Vladimir Vernadsky and the biologist Nikolai Konstantinovich Koltsov and had A. E. 
Fersman and B.B. Golizyn as secretaries. Vernadsky developed the leading role of the KEPS 
within the Russian mining industry, with a focus on the search for raw materials and their 
appraisal. The first Soviet People’s Commissar of Education Anatoly Vasilyevich Lunacha-
rsky returned as early as March 1918 to the achievements of the KEPS Commission, and 
subsequently the Communist government allocated an important share of the Academy’s 
budget to the Commission to encourage practical research. Vernadsky kept leading the 
Commission up to 1930, though Fersman was the one to take over management and co-
ordination tasks. The KEPS Commission founded a range of new research institutes in the 
1920s freed from educational obligations, and it took over the tasks of a planning commis-
sion for the state. The KEPS Commission thus developed into an institutional centre which 
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served as link between science and industry, and the institutions for applied science es-
tablished by her put into effect the science policy of the new government. The favourite 
form of these state-sponsored research institutions was directed towards advanced re-
search and utilitarian service. 
It was only belatedly, in mid-1915, when the shortage of munitions led the Tsarist bureau-
cracy to set up an organization of industrialists called the War-Industries Committees to 
assist the state to adapt Russia’s economy to the needs of the war. The chairman of the 
Central War-Industries Committee became Aleksander Ivanovich Guchkov, also president 
of the Third Duma and member of the State Council. In these Committees, large sections 
of the industrial bourgeoisie expanded the political and economic power of ‘civil society’ 
in the face of the government, which led to a delegitimization of the Tsarist government 
and the traditional state contractors which furnished the supply of war materiel. As can 
be read from the historical records kept in the Russian State Military History Archive, the 
Central State Historical Archive, and the records of the Department of Police in the Cen-
tral State Archive of the October Revolution (Secret Service personnel took part in the 
meetings of diverse Committees), many conflicts over industrial mobilization remained 
unresolved, and the dialectics between the Tsarist government and the fractions of the in-
dustrial bourgeoisie in the Committees led to stagnation, inefficiency, and disintegration. 
The War-Industries Committees did not unite Rus-
sian industry as their counterparts in Germany and 
Great Britain did, but challenged the state bureau-
cratic structures. Therefore, these Committees and 
the Zemgor, which was the Joint Committee of the 
Union of Zemstvos and of Towns for the Supply of 
Military Equipment and Munitions, did not survive 
for very long after the October Revolution. In July 
1918 they were dissolved. Nevertheless, the ques-
tion remains whether the networks of bourgeois 
industrialists which had been established during 
war should be seen as a resource whose influence 
can be traced well into the 1920s. 
While the mobilization of industrialists in the War-Industries Committees in general had 
an ambivalent outcome, the Russian economy developed dynamically during the war, 
starting from a low productivity level and being heavily dependent on imports of raw ma-
terials from abroad. A good example for this rapid development is evident in the chemical 
industries. The construction of several factories devoted to the production of chemicals 
formed the basis for a domestic Russian chemical industry, amongst which were plants to 
produce toluene and benzol, which were key components in the production of munitions 
and explosives. In May 1915, a “Special Commission on Poison Gases” was established with 
I.A. Krylov as chairman and with the support of the Russian Physical-Chemical Society. On 
initiative of the Commission and the Society, a War Chemical Committee was established 
in September 1915 , which after the First World War became the Institute for Applied 
Chemistry. In December 1914, the Central Scientific-Technical Laboratory was established, 
which had Professor-chemist and General A.A. Zabudskiy as its commander and which 
was in 1920 renamed to the State Scientific-Technical Institute (GONTI) with the chemist 
Vladimir N. Ipatieff as its director. Russia even produced its own gas masks, developed by 
Nikolai Zelinsky and Eduard L. Kumant in 1916. These accomplishments prove the lasting 
and catalysing effect on Russian science of the First World War, which resulted in the ex-
pansion of industrial production, the reorientation of scientists from theoretical to applied 
science, and the creation of institutional foundations for applied scientific research during 
and after the war.
Italy
In Italy the Great War represented a turning point in relation to the organization and 
promotion of scientific research. The mobilization of Italian scientists followed a different 
route if compared with that of other European countries such as Germany, France or the 
UK: there was indeed no strong national interest toward the creation of scientific associa-
tions or councils.
1915 sees the creation of the Comitato Nazionale delle Invenzioni di Guerra (CNIG); it was 
founded on the initiative of the Milanese member of parliament Giuseppe De Capitani 
d’Arzago. The Ministry of War at the time, led by Antonio Salandra, was pretty much de-
signed according to liberalist rules and not aiming at intervening in the private sector; 
however, in the context of the engineering university in Milan (Politecnico di Milano), the 
idea of creating a similar initiative of that of the Ministry of war started to take shape. 
Some of the major representatives of the Italian industry and science took part in the 
committee, such as Giuseppe Colombo, Giovanni Battista Pirelli, Carlo Esterle, Luigi Alber-
tini and Guglielmo Marconi. The activities of the committee recalled foreign policies, such 
as the ones in Great Britain or the United States, and it recognized the need to support, 
even monetarily, unexplored and unverified proposals and to set a preferential connec-
tion with the military administration.
In other intellectual and academic environments a new trend 
started to take shape, especially around the figure of the 
mathematician Vito Volterra. In 1916 he founded an “Italian 
Association for Intellectual Understanding between the al-
lied countries and friends” (Associazione Italiana per l’Intesa 
Intellettuale fra i Paesi Alleati e Amici AIIIPAA) which was an 
important center for exchanging ideas as well as very active 
in the editorial world and in the diffusion of Italian books; it 
continued its publication also after the end of the war. This 
association demonstrated to be appealing for the govern-
ment who decided to intervene, especially on the topic of 
scientific mobilization, following the example of other warring 
countries.
Also in 1916 the Comitato Nazionale Scientifico Tecnico per lo 
Sviluppo e l’Incremento dell’Industria Italiana (CNST) was cre-
ated following the idea of a group of industrial owners in Milan. The objective of this as-
sociation was that of tightening the connections between scientific research and industry. 
While the economic investment for this committee was not substantial, it nonetheless had 
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the power of putting pressure on the government, which in 1917 emitted a 3 million-lira 
investment directed to physics and chemical labs.
In 1918 Volterra founded the Ufficio Invenzioni e Ricerche (UIR) within the War Ministry 
and he was able to attract distinguished physics such as Orso Mario Corbino, Antonino 
Lo Surdo, Occhialini e Piola, the chemist Raffaello Nasini and the geologist Federico Mil-
losevich. Volterra was also very capable of maintaining good relationships with the French 
intellectual class, where the Comité Interallié des Inventions was established by the math-
ematician Paul Painlevé; its role was to connect and exchange international scientific 
research and its applications.
At the end of the war the idea of setting up an international organization for the support 
of international scientific research started to take shape. The Consiglio Internazionale 
delle Ricerche (CIR) was established after a few international conferences: the first, in Lon-
don in October 1918 (during the war) with the participation of nine allied countries; the 
second one in Paris in November 1918, where the “Consiglio Internazionale delle Ricerce 
provvisorio” was indeed set up. The Italian participation to the initiative was enthusiastic, 
and Volterra was elected in the executive committee, together with representatives of 
countries such as France, UK, US and Belgium.
In the years after the war it was crucial for Italy to set up a clear role of the scientific re-
search within the structures of the state and of private industry. Volterra aspired to estab-
lish the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR). In 1919 a dedicated commission started 
to prepare a project for the constitution of a National Research Council; the aim was to 
gather the expertise of other institutions such as of the UIR, the committee for the chemi-
cal industry of the Ministry of Industry, the National Scientific Committee and the Central 
Institute for Aeronautics. The council should have had the role of organizing and promote 
scientific and industrial research for the national defense.
The CNR would be based in Rome and be controlled by the Ministry of Industry. The coun-
cil would be focused on promotional aspects of scientific and applied research, on the 
reuse of the country’s resources and would have a strong affiliation with the public admin-
istration. Relevant, but not a priority, would be the relation with international scientific 
centers. The main scientific subjects represented in the first CNR design were mathemat-
ics, engineering and mechanics, physics and its applications, chemistry and its applica-
tions, mineralogy and geology, aerodynamics, biological science and its applications (espe-
cially agriculture and cattle-breeding), applications in relation to national defense.
Unfortunately the years 1919/ 1920 saw very slow development of the plan for setting 
up the CNR, mainly due to the fact that the council was not considered a high priority for 
the Nitti Government. It is only with the establishment of the Mussolini government in 
1923 that new perspectives for the constitution of the CNR showed up. In fact, in 1923 the 
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche was established, directed by Vito Volterra and following 
the focus points designed just a few years earlier. The main addition worthwhile mention-
ing here is the strong international component, in particular with the Union Académique 
Internationale, based in Bruxelles.
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